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Abstract
We investigate identity lease, a new type of service in which
users lease their identities to third parties by providing them
with full or restricted access to their online accounts or creden-
tials. We discuss how identity lease could be abused to subvert
the digital society, facilitating the spread of fake news and
subverting electronic voting by enabling the sale of votes. We
show that the emergence of Trusted Execution Environments
and anonymous cryptocurrencies, for the first time, allows
the implementation of such a lease service while guarantee-
ing fairness, plausible deniability and anonymity, therefore
shielding the users and account renters from prosecution. To
show that such a service can be practically implemented, we
build an example service that we call TEEVIL leveraging In-
tel SGX and ZCash. Finally, we discuss defense mechanisms
and challenges in the mitigation of identity lease services.
1 Introduction
Different online platforms collect, share and monetize user’s
data. From this data they infer user behaviors and prefer-
ences [69] which can then be used for better product place-
ment or to exert influence over the users [26]. Not only data,
but also user actions can have value and be monetized. Third
parties can instruct real users to perform arbitrary actions
online in exchange for money – an activity called crowdturf-
ing [87]. Crowdturfing platforms facilitate these exchanges,
by connecting customers, entities that want some action to
be conducted online to workers, regular users that can be
hired to perform various tasks. These tasks range from post-
ing advertisements, comments or reviews related to products
and venues, interacting with (e.g., “liking”) the content on
Online Social Networks (OSNs), to click-fraud operations
against Pay-per-Click advertisement providers. This type of
advertisement is more impactful than the traditional means
because it poses as “grass-root” word-of-mouth opinions of
(allegedly) real users, whose identity lends credibility to the
content [14, 36].
In this work we investigate a new type of user monetiza-
tion, that we name identity lease, in which users lease their
accounts and online credentials to third parties. Those third
parties can then control those accounts within some defined
temporal and other limits.
We show that identity lease has the potential to have a
significant societal impact – it can be used to generate and
enhance the spread of fake news, and ultimately to sway elec-
tions by e.g., buying votes. Existing crowdturfing platforms
limit the reach of such activities. Such platforms require work-
ers to manually execute tasks and customers to subsequently
verify them. They do not offer any privacy guarantees for the
workers, and when executing payments expose the platform
and workers to legal risks – e.g., sale and purchase of votes is
illegal in almost all jurisdictions [40, 77, 80].
To have a higher impact, such platforms either need to re-
cruit more workers or resort to the use of fake accounts. As the
example of fake news shows, the use of fake accounts can only
have a limited impact [74, 78]. The fake news phenomenon is
driven by targeted, carefully crafted misinformation. OSNs
are then used to maximize the misinformation’s impact by
allowing to easily target separate audiences with different al-
ternative facts, resulting sometimes in the change of election
results [10, 74, 83]. To make such campaigns more effective
these stories should not only be started by dubious sources
and spread through fake accounts but need to be accepted and
spread by real users within their social networks. A party that
could lease a large number of real identities would therefore
have the ability to spread fake news more effectively and in
much more subtle ways. This would amount to the purchase
of a large number of small-scale influencers.
Big social networks have been under pressure from gov-
ernments to address the spread of fake news. Their natural
reaction has been to track down fake news sources and fake
accounts thus stopping their spread into the networks of real
users [35,78,79]. However, if fake news were to be introduced
by large numbers of real active users and inserted among their
regular posts then not only would their impact be more pro-
nounced, but it would make their identification and removal
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more complex for OSN operators. The identification of such
carefully placed fake news would then require looking into
message content [21, 75] and their removal would have impli-
cations on free speech and censorship [70].
Furthermore, if identity lease would be done without the
manual participation of the users while preserving the confi-
dentiality of their OSN credentials and remunerated through
anonymous payments, such a system would attract a wider
set of workers.
If the platform could in addition guarantee fairness, it
would then further offer all the necessary properties for the
large scale sale and purchase of votes in an e-voting system.
It would ensure that voters get paid only if the buyer gets valid
voting credentials, as well as that the payment is executed
when the vote is cast by the buyer. It would enable the voters
to sell their votes while shielding them from prosecution.
We aim to show that Trusted Execution Environments
(TEEs) coupled with distributed ledgers (and thus cryptocur-
rencies) represent almost an ideal set of technologies that
can underpin identity lease. Ultimately, these new technolo-
gies create the ability to sell/buy/rent digital identities on a
massive scale while preserving indistinguishability, plausi-
ble deniability and fairness between customers and worker,
therefore, having the potential to undermine entire societies.
To illustrate this, we introduce TEEVIL, a system that allows
users to lease their online accounts to renters while preserv-
ing the above properties. Further, our system can provide
its users reasonable anonymity guarantees, with the assump-
tion that some specific actions they might sell can potentially
de-anonymize them.We implemented TEEVIL within Intel
SGX [23] and used ZCash [72] for anonymous payment; the
renter leased a Reddit account from the user, allowing it to
interact in the user’s name.
This paper focuses on the technical design of an identity
lease system and discusses countermeasures that could be
raised against such systems, all in the hope that such behaviors
would be detected and prevented before they emerge in the
wild.
Contributions.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Problem: we highlight the problem that arises when a
large number of people are allowed to lease their online
identities and sell access to their accounts, automatically
and without any repercussion. Additionally, we explore
the impact of this phenomenon on existing and future
e-voting systems [2].
• TEEVIL System: We present and implement TEEVIL,
an architecture for identity lease that is fair, privacy pre-
serving, and completely automated for account owners
and renters. TEEVIL leverages a careful combination
of escrows to cryptocurrencies with trusted execution
to achieve fairness, and disincentivize all parties from
trying to cheat the protocol. TEEVIL protects users cre-
dentials by limiting their use through TEEs [61], and
protects anonymity of such transactions through anony-
mous cryptocurrencies [72]. In particular, TEEVIL al-
lows the replacement of the crowdturfing middlemen
with TEEs1, hence removing entities from the picture
that can be coerced to reveal information about owners
and renters.
• Countermeasures: We discuss possible countermeasures
against identity lease in general, and to TEEVIL in par-
ticular, highlighting that stopping these systems might
be challenging in some scenarios and requires more re-
search attention.
Outline. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
In Section 2, we introduce the problem, describing some ap-
plications in which an identity leasing marketplace can be
disruptive in current digital societies. In Section 3, we intro-
duce TEEVIL, a protocol for fair and secure identity sharing,
and detail its protocol, followed by the security analysis in
Section 4. Then, we change perspective and summarize pos-
sible defences that can mitigate the effects of TEEVIL in
Section 5. In Section 6, we describe our prototype implemen-
tation of TEEVIL and analyze its performance. In Section 7,
we discuss two improved distributed designs of TEEVIL and
how it can be combined with anonymous networks. Finally,
we conclude in Section 8.
2 Problem Statement
In this section we introduce the problem through two motivat-
ing examples, discuss why existing techniques were not well
suited to solve this problem and why TEEs and anonymous
cryptocurrencies represent almost ideal candidate technolo-
gies in this problem space.
2.1 Motivating examples
Providing the ability to entities to lease identities on a large
scale could have a number of negative consequences for dig-
ital societies. It can be used to subvert digital societies by
polarizing and influencing the opinions of its members, to pol-
lute automatic recommender systems, bootstrap the virality
of content on online social networks, and subvert democratic
processes, to name a few.
We discuss two examples in more detail: electronic voting
and posts in online social networks.
Electronic Voting. Lease of government-issued electronic
identities allows miscreants to buy votes in e-voting platforms.
While in-person e-vote selling is unpractical (the miscreant
would need to be co-located with the seller at the time of
1Note that this, however, inherently shifts trust to the TEE manufacturer.
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voting, as e-voting systems do not provide any proof of whom
a vote was cast for), online rental would allow the miscreant to
cast votes to their candidate of choice. There usually exists a
subset of people which argue that their vote would not matter,
and could, therefore, be persuaded to sell their vote. Even
a small amount of votes can swing election results [66] and
greatly influence politics and democracies.
Online Social Networks (OSNs). In the context of OSNs,
miscreants could leverage peer trust, and post advertisement
masked as legitimate content – for example post, “like”, or
“reshare” some product. Influential peers that maximize the
impact of content can be selected with targeted, topic-specific
heuristics [7, 17, 42, 54]. This could destroy the conventional
centralized advertisement business model of OSNs, shifting
to a new peer-to-peer paradigm where every account is a po-
tential “influencer” since users are highly influenced by posts
from their peers [73, 93]. Miscreants can also manipulate
content virality processes: patterns of content diffusion and
virality processes on online communities [18, 30, 39] can be
leveraged to maximize the efficacy of the crucial initial phase
of the life-cycle of news and rumors [85] – a worrisome sce-
nario for the uncontrolled spreading of fake news. Regarding
politics, friendship relationships and trust could be leveraged
to “water down” opposite views (for example by comment-
ing or posting that an opposite party politician “maybe has
a point”). Such a strategy could be impactful, as diverging
opinions are otherwise very unlikely to reach “echo chambers”
that are oppositely polarized [27]. Rented accounts could also
give a fake sense of grass-root approval to extreme views2,
and efficiently promote fake news and conspiracy theories
that find fertile soil in already polarized communities due to
confirmation biases [9, 85] – and debunking news after they
have gone viral is largely ineffective [39, 95].
2.2 Requirements
A system that allows identity lease at a large scale is likely to
violate the terms of service of online platforms, and in some
cases will be illegal to operate or to participate in, notably
in the case of a sale of votes in government elections. To
achieve its goal the system therefore needs to include proper
monetary incentives but at the same time guarantees fairness
and impunity. Such a system would therefore need to satisfy
the following properties.
Fairness. Identity owners and identity renter should exchange
services for payment. Upon the completion of the transac-
tion, the identity renter would have used the identity owners’s
account, and the identity owner would have received the pay-
ment. There would be no incentive to put up accounts for
rental on a system where fairness is not guaranteed; the same
2The virality of the “PizzaGate” and “QAnon” conspiracy theories was
bootstrapped by accounts posing as real people [38].
holds if identity renters are not guaranteed to receive what
they pay for.
Indistinguishability. From the point of view of the service
any action coming from rented identities should be indistin-
guishable from actions manually performed by the original
identity owners. Given the grey area of identity lease, it is
likely that targeted services (for which accounts are put up
for rental) would want to block such activities. If they could
therefore distinguish between “normal” user actions and ac-
tions performed while the account is rented to a third party,
they could intervene. Indistinguishability guarantees that the
service is oblivious to the rental process.
Plausible Deniability. All parties should be able to plausibly
deny their participation in such a system or in a particular
campaign. This would make it difficult for services or au-
thorities to take action against identity owners and identity
renters.
2.3 Existing Approaches and Limitations
Candidate technologies that could provide the aforementioned
properties include a range of fair exchange, zero-knowledge,
multi-party computation, and distributed ledger techniques.
However, all these approaches fail to solve this problem and
to satisfy all the required properties. In fact, most would
require the cooperation of online services, which goes against
their business interests.
Any protocol built using the technologies mentioned above
requires some proof that the commissioned actions were per-
formed correctly. While multi-party computation (MPC) and
Zero-Knowledge (ZK) protocols could be used to build such
proof, they would all be limited by the interface of the ser-
vice (e.g., e-voting or the OSN) to which the identity owner
presents its credentials. These services typically offer only
simple login credentials and do not run ZK or MPC protocols.
In the example of electronic voting, a fair exchange would
require the identity owner to either give its voting credentials
to the identity renter or to present the proof that he/she voted in
a particular way. Deployed electronic systems do not provide
such proofs (e.g., [2]), and without a trusted third party, no
protocol will guarantee the fairness of this exchange [34, 37].
Smart contracts [15] that run on top of distributed ledgers
can also seem like a proper solution for a fair exchange. Juels
et al. investigated how smart contracts could be used for
criminal activities while still guaranteeing a fair exchange
for the participants [51], and Dziembowski at al. explored
how general fair exchange protocols can be built on smart
contracts [31]. However, both approaches cannot directly be
applied to our setting. In [51], in order to participate in the
criminal smart contract, the identity owner needs to publicly
reveal his action on the blockchain, where it will be visible by
everyone, thus violating the indistinguishability and plausible
deniability requirements. This limitation could be circum-
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vented by requiring a ZK proof of the action, as done in [31]
and for some of the use cases described in [51]. However, as
pointed out above, this requires the cooperation of the service
provider. Finally, all the current blockchains that support
smart contracts and are expressive enough for our use cases
do not provide any strong anonymity guarantee, making it
challenging to provide plausible deniability to identity owners
and identity renters.
A blog post by Dian et al. [25] proposed a combination of
smart contracts and trusted execution environments to create
a marketplace for votes in the context of blockchain voting.
However, it only focuses on votes that take place entirely
on the blockchain and does not easily generalize to arbitrary
off-chain e-voting systems. Further, it is unclear how and
whether the various proposals in the blog post can achieve
fairness and plausible deniability even in the context of pure
blockchain votes.
To conclude, existing techniques cannot satisfy all the prop-
erties mentioned above at the same time: so far, it is impossi-
ble to deploy a system that allows leasing identities en masse
and hence subvert digital societies.
3 TEEVIL
Recently, mainstream vendors, such as Intel [23], ARM [4],
and RISC-V [1, 24], started deploying Trusted Execution En-
vironments (TEEs) in their processors. TEEs are becoming a
commodity technology, increasingly widely deployed even in
consumer devices. Due to their diffusion, TEEs are enabling
new use-cases thanks to their security properties. However,
TEEs can not only be used for good – nefarious applications
have yet to be explored. In this paper, we show how TEEs
enable building a large-scale marketplace for identity lease.
There are five main parties participating in TEEVIL:
• Identity Owner: Any entity that enrolls in TEEVIL to
offer some actions to be performed on their behalf.
• Identity Renter: Any entity that wants to start an iden-
tity rental campaign. The identity renter needs to specify
what should be performed through the leased identities,
and how much he would pay for such service.
• Service: The service is an online social network (OSN),
e-voting system, or any online service for which a iden-
tity renter is interested in using other people’s identities
through their accounts to perform some actions on their
behalf.
• TEEVIL Enclave: The code running in the TEE is re-
sponsible for managing all the interactions between the
identity owners, the identity renters, the service(s) and
the funds in the cryptocurrency. A set of supported
functions for the services is exposed to identity renters.
Renters can then specify through an API which actions
they would like to buy and for which services. The en-
clave performs these actions on behalf of identity owners
and distributes the funds accordingly.
• Infrastructure Maintainer: The infrastructure main-
tainer provides the infrastructure that hosts the enclaves.
There could be multiple infrastructure maintainers run-
ning the same services, and identity renters and identity
owners are free to choose the ones they prefer, based
for instance on the fees the infrastructure maintainers
charge or the services they support.
TEEVIL replaces the trusted intermediary of crowdturfing
campaigns with a protocol that runs on top of TEE and anony-
mous cryptocurrencies on distributed ledgers. As we show,
this combination of a ledger and TEEs enables large-scale
identity leasing while guaranteeing fairness and plausible
deniability.
The TEE provides three important properties to TEEVIL:
(i) it protects the details (e.g., credentials) of the parties; (ii) it
allows to automate all actions that the worker should perform
(that are now performed by the verifiable code), and removes
the need for manually proving and verifying the execution of
actions; finally (iii) it provides fair exchange by managing
funds with a decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency such
as ZCash. As it provides automatic execution of actions
by the TEE from leased accounts, TEEVIL greatly extends
crowdturfing by offering better properties, and enabling a
large-scale marketplace.
In the following, we give an overview of TEEVIL, instanti-
ating the TEE on top of which it is built with Intel SGX and
using ZCash as the anonymous cryptocurrency.
3.1 TEEVIL Overview
In Figure 1 we show the main interactions within TEEVIL.
Identity owners enroll in the system in step 1, by securely
sending their credentials of the target service and their public
cryptocurrency address to the TEEVIL SGX enclave. In step
2a, identity renters start a new campaign by communicating
to the enclave which actions they wish to buy from identity
owners, and in step 2b, by transferring funds to an address
controlled by the enclave on an anonymous public blockchain.
In step 3, the enclave automatically performs actions by us-
ing the identity owners’ devices as proxies, so that from the
service’s point of view the action appears as any other normal
activity of the identity owner. Step 3 is repeated for every
user enrolled in TEEVIL. Finally, in step 4, as soon as the
enclave receives the confirmation that the action performed
in step 3 was done successfully, it issues a transaction to the
blockchain that transfers the reward to the relevant identity
owner.
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Identity owners
Service
Anonymous Cryptocurrency
Identity renter
Proxy
TEEVIL
1. Credentials
4. Payment
3. Perform Action
2a. Buy Actions
2b. Provide Funds4. Reward user
Figure 1: Overview of the TEEVIL protocol showing how its
entities interact with each other.
3.2 TEEVIL System Details
We now present the protocols and message flow within
TEEVIL. To facilitate the analysis, we describe the protocol
as if a single infrastructure maintainer is present. We discuss
in Section 7.1 how this design can be distributed to support
multiple infrastructure maintainers.
The TEEVIL protocol consists of three main parts, depicted
in the right-hand side of Figure 2: enrollment of identity
owners, campaign creation, and automatic interactions. We
outline each one of them in the following sections.
3.2.1 Enrollment of Identity Owners
Three prerequisites have to be met by a user to enroll in
TEEVIL as an identity owner: the user needs to have creden-
tials for a valid account for a service supported by the TEEVIL
enclave, a cryptocurrency address to receive rewards, and a
proxy on one of its devices.
The TEEVIL enclave exposes a web interface in which
the identity owners can create a TEEVIL account, where all
the user’s information can be entered. The connection is se-
cured with a TLS connection whose endpoints are the identity
owner’s device and the enclave, such that not even the OS in
which the enclave is running can observe the data exchanged
by the identity owner. The code of the enclave is public, and
as part of the connection establishment, the identity owner
checks the attestation of the enclave to make sure that it is
communicating with a legitimate TEEVIL enclave running
inside a genuine SGX CPU.
Once the identity owner has established a secure connec-
tion with the TEEVIL enclave, it provides the credentials
of its proxy server (if any are specified). Before proceeding
further, the TEEVIL enclave ensures that the proxy is work-
ing correctly by sending a nonce to itself trough the user’s
proxy. As soon as the proxy is operational, the user can start
providing the credentials and policies of the various accounts
it wishes to rent out.
The enclave provides a list of services to the identity owner,
for example various social media platforms. For each service,
the identity owner inputs his own credentials, and selects a
set of policies. The policies are specific to each service, and
can restrict the type of content that can be associated with the
identity owners through TEEVIL, or what kind of actions will
be performed on their behalf. For instance, policies can be
set to allow only “likes”, or only pictures to be posted on a
social network, or, in an e-voting platform, vote for candidates
only if they belong to a particular political party. The enclave
then checks the credentials of the service by trying to log-in
to each one of them. After a successful login the service is
considered as successfully enrolled.
The identity owner finally provides the cryptocurrency ad-
dress to receive rewards. From this point on the various ac-
counts entered by the identity owner can be rented by identity
renters.
3.2.2 Campaign Creation
The TEEVIL enclave exposes a separate web interface to
identity renters. The connection to this web interface is set up
in the same way as described in Section 3.2.1 for the identity
owners. That is, the TLS endpoints are at the identity renters
browsers and in the enclave, and before exchanging any secret
the identity renter attests to the code of the TEEVIL enclave.
As opposed to identity owners (cf. Section 3.2.1), identity
renters do not to create any account with the TEEVIL enclave
and do not need to have any proxy installed. Identity renters
are provided with a set of supported automatic actions for
each service. As an example, for a social media campaign,
they can provide a link to a post and the number of likes they
wish to reach on that post, or they can provide a user and the
number of new “followers” they want that user to obtain; in
an e-voting service, identity renters can provide the name of
a candidate and the number of votes they want it to receive.
Five main steps have to be completed to start a campaign.
First, the identity renter fills in the campaign details. Second,
the enclave displays the expected price3 for the specified
campaign. Third, the identity renter covers the amount of the
campaign and an upfront deposit by transferring money to the
cryptocurrency address of the TEEVIL enclave. The deposit
will be refunded to the identity renter during the campaign,
and we use it to guarantee fairness, as explained in Section 4.
Fourth, the identity renter provides its cryptocurrency address,
a transaction ID, and the latest block of the blockchain to the
enclave. Finally, once the TEEVIL enclave verifies that the
transaction exists, it has enough confirmation blocks and that
the amount transferred is sufficient, it starts the campaign.
3The enclave always provides an upper bound, since the actual price is
determined by the individual price of each account used.
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3.2.3 Automatic Interactions
As soon as the campaign begins the enclave starts contact-
ing identity owners whose policies are compatible with the
actions of the campaign, we call the accounts of the identity
owners that are compatible with the campaign “compliant ac-
counts”. For each identity owner that has a compliant account,
the enclave performs two main operations. First, it uses the
proxy in the identity owner’s enrolled device to get the latest
block from the point of view of that identity owner. If the re-
trieved block is not consistent (cf. Appendix A.2) with the one
sent by the identity renter at campaign creation, the TEEVIL
enclave does not perform any action for this identity owner in
this campaign. Second, if the previous step was successful, it
connects to the service through the identity owner’s proxy. By
doing so, from the point of view of the service the connection
appears as if it is initiated from the identity owner’s device.
Once the TEEVIL enclave establishes the connection with
the service, it performs the action requested in the campaign
on behalf of the identity owner. The enclave waits for a con-
firmation from the service. For some types of actions, the
identity renters might require that the action is not manually
reverted by the identity owners within a specified time-frame,
in these cases the enclave delays the check until the end of the
defined time-frame. Upon successful verification, the enclave
issues a transaction on the blockchain that pays the identity
owner in the address specified during enrollment and returns
a share of the deposit to the identity renter.
When the target number of actions of the campaign is
reached, or if there are no more compliant accounts to em-
ploy, the enclave terminates the campaign. As part of the
termination, any remaining campaign funds and the rest of
the deposit are returned to the identity renter on the cryptocur-
rency address specified at campaign creation.
3.3 Protocol
We now put together all the steps of the protocol described
in the previous subsections. We depict the general flow of
a TEEVIL campaign in Figure 2, where each number in the
figure corresponds to the following steps:
1. Identity owners enroll in TEEVIL. They attest the en-
clave and provide the enclave access to a proxy running
on their devices, their credentials for various services,
and a set of policies for these services.
2. An identity renter connects to the enclave and specifies
the details of a campaign.
3. The identity renter provides the funds necessary for the
campaign and a deposit to the TEEVIL enclave’s cryp-
tocurrency address.
4. The identity renter sends the final campaign confirmation
and the latest block to the enclave. The enclave then
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Figure 2: The protocol of TEEVIL.
checks if the funds are received correctly and selects
compliant accounts to fulfill the campaign.
5. The enclave fetches the latest block through each com-
pliant accounts proxy and checks the consistency with
the block provided by the identity renter.
6. The enclave performs the action via the proxy on the
identity owner’s device.
7. The enclave issues the reward transaction to the respec-
tive compliant account. A share of the deposit is imme-
diately returned to the identity renter. If specified by
the identity renter, the enclave waits a specified time
and checks that the action has not been reverted before
issuing the transaction.
Once the campaign is over, or if no more compliant ac-
counts can be reached, the enclave returns the remaining
campaign funds and deposit to the identity renter.
3.4 The TEEVIL Enclaves
So far we considered the TEEVIL enclave as a single enclave
that takes care of all the interactions between all the entities
in TEEVIL. However, in the interest of modularity (and later
scalability), we split the enclave into three parts: (1) the
interface enclave, (2) the service enclave, and (3) the payment
enclave. We depict them and how they interact with each
other in Figure 3. Note that there is an enlistment phase in
which the enclaves attest each other, and at this time they
exchange their public keys to later establish a secure TLS
channel between them without having to repeat attestation.
Interface Enclave. The interface enclave is the entry point
to all the other enclaves: Users of TEEVIL (identity owners
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Interface Enclave
Identity owner
Identity renter
Service Enclaves
Payment Enclaves Cryptocurrency
Service
Figure 3: Architecture of the TEEVIL enclaves.
and identity renters) will use it to start campaigns and enroll
their credentials. The interface enclave stores all enrolled cre-
dentials and synchronizes the actions of the service enclaves
and the payment enclaves. During an enlistment phase the
interface enclaves allows an administrator to enroll service
and payment enclaves.
Service Enclave. A different service enclave exists for each
supported service. For instance, to support a particular so-
cial network, a service enclave that knows how to interface
with that social network needs to be developed. The service
enclave exposes a list of service specific tasks and policies
to the interface enclave. The attestation report of all service
enclaves is also exposed by the interface enclave, so that
users can decide to trust only a particular implementation of
a service enclave.
The service enclave receives proxy configuration parame-
ters, credentials, and policies from the interface enclave and
tries to fulfill the received tasks by contacting the service
through the identity owner’s proxy. It then sends confirma-
tions of completed actions back to the interface enclave. The
service enclaves do not keep any permanent information about
the identity owners data. Each service enclave is independent
of each other, and allows to scale the number of requests made
to the service, as the more enclaves there are the more tasks
can be performed in parallel.
Payment Enclave. Similar to the service enclaves there can
be multiple implementations of payment enclaves, in this case,
each supporting a different digital currency (for more details
see Appendix A). However, to ease explanation, we assume
there exists a single implementation that supports ZCash.
At the beginning of the campaign, funds are split into
smaller shares each of which is controlled by one payment
enclave which can then issue transactions independently. To
guarantee that all the reward transactions are correctly issued,
all transactions of one payment enclave depend on each other:
each following transaction uses the unspent output of the pre-
vious transaction. Since a share of the deposit is released with
every reward transaction, we can guarantee that if the entire
deposit is returned then all rewards have been paid as well.
The payment enclaves share a backup copy of their private
keys to access the funds with the interface enclave. In the
case of a crash of a payment enclave, the interface enclave
can use said keys to restore the funds.
4 Security Analysis
In this section we informally analyze the security of TEEVIL
through provided guarantees of the three main system prop-
erties – fairness, indistiguishability, and plausible deniability
(cf. Section 2). We look at two different adversary models.
First, we consider the case in which every protocol partici-
pant and third parties try to violate fairness. Second, for the
latter two properties, we consider a powerful attacker that
wants to expose the participants. Thus, the various protocol
participants can cooperate to prevent disruption of TEEVIL.
Regarding TEEVIL enclaves, we assume the standard SGX
adversary model: the adversary controls the OS on the plat-
form where the enclaves run, and can tap into the memory
bus, but cannot tamper with the CPU package. Additionally,
the adversary can delay or drop any network packet – how-
ever, she cannot see or modify the content of packets if the
enclave serves as the TLS endpoint. We assume no adversary
can compromise the enclaves and we trust the TEE manufac-
turer (i.e., Intel) to not fake attestation queries, or otherwise
compromise the security of any SGX capable CPUs, either
voluntarily or under coercion from an external party. Roll-
back attacks are out of scope – we refer the interested reader
to [12, 60].
4.1 Violating Fairness
Parties participating in the protocol are interested in violating
fairness to get economical advantages. However, external enti-
ties (e.g., services targeted by TEEVIL) can also be interested
in violating fairness in the hopes of damaging the reputation
of TEEVIL and push identity owners and identity renters to
leave the platform. We first detail the considered threat model,
then analyze security against protocol participants, and finally
against external adversaries.
Threat Model. All three protocol parties want to break fair-
ness, i.e., the identity renter wants to obtain actions without
paying for them, the identity owner wants to get rewards
without performing actions, and the infrastructure maintainer
wants to get fees without doing the required work. Parties
might also collude to break fairness. We assume that protocol
parties act rationally and are moved by economic reasons,
thus would not do any action that could impact their stakes
in the system. However, there might be external adversaries
compromising any of the parties – such entities can act with-
out the fear of economic repercussions and can make the
compromised parties act against their interest. We do not pro-
vide any fairness guarantee to these compromised parties, and
analyze how they would impact the remaining honest parties.
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Figure 4: Adversaries controlling the OS of the infrastructure
maintainer, or the local network of protocol participants, can
cut network connections at the points marked 1–5 to try to
disrupt the protocol and its properties. Note that the content
of message 1 and 2 can be modified by the identity renters
and identity owners, respectively, since there is no TLS con-
nection to the blockchain nodes.
Given adversarial capabilities and the assumed SGX ad-
versary model, we highlight that no misbehaving party can
impact the protocol by modifying execution of the TEEVIL
enclave at any step, or by modifying the content of network
messages. Hence, an adversary can only affect fairness by
cutting network messages of the protocol: Figure 4 depicts
all susceptible messages.
Protocol Participants. We now analyze the fairness guaran-
tees of TEEVIL when only protocol participants try to cut
connections and messages. The identity renter initiates a cam-
paign by sending its current view of the blockchain to the
enclave. The identity renter has full control over the content
of this message, and could send the TEEVIL enclave a dif-
ferent view of the blockchain if he so wishes (message (1)
in Figure 4). Then, by cutting message (2) of Figure 4, the
identity renter could try to trick the enclave into performing
an action without actually having the funds. The attacker
hence effectively forges the enclave’s view of the blockchain.
However, TEEVIL will only perform an action on behalf of
an identity owner if and only if the blockchain state from the
identity owner is consistent with the one provided by the iden-
tity renter. If an adversary can carry out a successful double
spend attack against some identity owners, then he can break
the fairness property for these specific parties, but not against
other unaffected identity owners.
The identity renter might also try to cut the response of the
external service, that is message (3) in Figure 4. The enclave
will then never get a confirmation of the completed action
but it will also not get an error message, and it is, therefore,
able to distinguish an attack from incorrect credentials4. In
this case, the identity renter would lose a part of his deposit.
4Note that identity owners could try to fake message (3) by exposing a
controlled copy of the target service to the enclave – however, this can be
prevented by existing countermeasures such as certificate pinning [33].
Messages (4) and (5) in Figure 4 are intrinsically linked since
both the reward and the share of the deposit are linked into a
single transaction. By blocking this transaction, the identity
renter would lose his share of the deposit.
Any of the previously mentioned messages could also be
blocked by the infrastructure maintainer. However, he would
forfeit his fees, since the infrastructure maintainer gets the
fees with the reward transaction (messages (4) and (5) in
Figure 4), so he has incentives to keep the system running as
long as possible.
In conclusion, tampering with any of the five messages
highlighted in Figure 4 would result in losses for all parties
(even when colluding): identity renters (escrow), identity
owners (reward) and infrastructure maintainers (service fees)
– thus, no rational party would perform this attack.
External Adversaries. As discussed, an external adversary
can compromise any protocol party and make them act irra-
tionally to try to break fairness for other parties (no guarantee
of fairness is given to the compromised party). We now ana-
lyze what happens to the remaining protocol participants:
• A compromised identity renter cannot impact the fair-
ness for any other party, since it can only tamper with
messages (1) and (4) of Figure 4. As discussed, tam-
pering with message (1) has no implication for identity
owners that have the correct view of the blockchain, and
cutting message (4) does not prevent the reward to the
identity owner because she receives a copy of this trans-
action as well in message (5).
• A compromised identity owner might cut message (3)
and forfeit the reward in order to destroy a small share
of the deposit, thus hurting the identity renter.
• A compromised infrastructure maintainer could ei-
ther shut down the enclave upon receiving the funds, or
he could cut messages (3) or the reward transaction in
Figure 4, thus executing all actions but not paying any
reward and destroying the deposit.
Additionally, a service targeted by TEEVIL is in the unique
position of being able to fake the proof of performed action
(message 3 of Figure 4). This can happen if the service col-
ludes with identity owners (for example by registering a large
set of fake identity owners to a TEEVIL enclave), therefore
it knows when it receives a rented action and provides fake
responses accordingly. If the result of the rented action is
observable, such as a “like” on a OSN, this is trivially pre-
vented: the enclave can verify “externally” (e.g., through a
legit account) if the action was performed. However, if the
result of the action is not observable, like in e-voting, the
service can violate fairness successfully. We discuss a Peer-
to-Peer design for TEEVIL that can mitigate this scenario by
requiring one SGX CPU per enrolled account in Section 7.1.
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4.2 Exposing Parties
Services targeted by TEEVIL might try to limit its impact by
breaking indistinguishability and filtering fraudulent actions.
In the case of e-voting, the service provider (i.e., a govern-
ment) might also try to punish participants of TEEVIL with
legal repercussions by breaking plausible deniability. Here
we first elaborate on such a threat model, then analyze the
security against non colluding and colluding adversaries.
Threat Model. Indistinguishability and plausible deniability
require a different threat model: uncompromised protocol
participants might want to cheat on each other regarding fair-
ness, but ultimately they still want to perform the exchange
of money for identities. As they have monetary stakes in
the system, they will not try to expose each other without
any external influence, and can instead cooperate to avoid
being exposed. Therefore, the adversaries we consider here
are external entities that can possibly compromise protocol
participants (to expose other participants, as the exposure of
the compromised party is trivial), and the services targeted
by TEEVIL. All these adversaries can collude to reach their
goal.
Once again, we assume the previously described standard
SGX adversary model where the adversary can cut connec-
tions and power down enclaves, but the enclaves execution
or the messages cannot be modified. Additionally, services
have full control over their platform, and can run any kind
of analysis on users’ actions to try to find accounts that have
been rented. As a discussion point, we also consider global
network attackers with a complete view of the network.
No Collusion. When assuming no collusion, the adversary is
in full control of a single entity (e.g., the service) but cannot
cooperate with any other entity. For indistinguishability, as-
suming that protocol participants do not try to expose each
other, the only possible adversary is the service. Indeed, ser-
vices targeted by TEEVIL are the only ones that can analyze
users’ actions – and thus can try to distinguish between fraud-
ulent (i.e., rented) and genuine actions. To do so, services
can analyze both users’ behavior on their platforms, to under-
stand if actions are performed automatically or by a human;
services can also analyze the result of users’ actions, e.g.,
posted or “liked” content, to try to detect fraudulent actions.
These are active research areas, proposing techniques such as
CAPTCHAs [84], or Machine Learning tools to build behav-
ioral and content profiles to detect misbehaving users [41, 82]
and their actions [48, 65]. The literature on these topics is
extensive – we report the main research results in Section 5.1,
where we discuss that there is still no conclusive counter-
measure to stop systems such as TEEVIL. Here, we only
highlight that such areas of detection are subject to cat-and-
mouse games, where adversaries can often avoid detection by
changing their strategy after defenders deploy their counter-
measures [52, 82, 86, 92].
Colluding Adversary. A stronger adversary can collude with
any party and, is possibly, a global network adversary. The ser-
vice can collude with identity renters, and create campaigns
with specific targets that therefore de-anonymize identity own-
ers (e.g., a OSN asking to “like” a post that is only visible
via a direct link, to prevent legitimate interactions). Another
possible attack includes observing all the connections to and
from any TEEVIL enclave, thus correlating them to the iden-
tity owner’s proxy and to the service. Given the ability to then
link these connections with the service’s accounts it would be
possible to identify identity owners participating in TEEVIL,
breaking both indistinguishability and plausible deniability.
Even adding an anonymity network (e.g., Tor, as we discuss
in Section 7.2) does not mitigate against this attacker, since a
global network attacker is outside the Tor threat model. There-
fore under this attacker model, for services that allow to link
actions with identity owners (e.g., social networks, but not
e-voting), TEEVIL cannot guarantee indistinguishability and
plausible deniability.
4.3 Anonymity
In the general case, all operation on TEEVIL are anonymous:
identity renters do not learn any detail about identity owners,
whose credentials are securely stored and not accessible even
by the infrastructure maintainers. However, there could be
specific actions and target services that can violate anonymity.
For example, when the bought action has an observable result
(e.g., interactions on OSNs, as opposed to e-voting), iden-
tity owners could see who is the target, and identity renters
could try to correlate the start of campaigns and the results
of the bought actions. Note that, even in this case, both par-
ties can still appeal to plausible deniability. More powerful
adversaries are infrastructure maintainers, who could track IP
addresses of identity owners and identity renters; in general,
powerful network adversaries could correlate IP addresses
connecting to the enclave and subsequently to target services.
If such a strong adversary would collude with the target ser-
vice, they could directly expose users’ rented accounts, and
act accordingly. Network adversaries can be mitigated (with
the exception of timing correlations) by using mix networks
such as Tor [29], as we discuss in Section 7.2. While there is
no general solution to deanonymization by specific actions,
identity owners can specify policies regarding the actions that
they are willing to sell, thus specifying the amount of risk
they are willing to take.
5 Defenses
We now shift perspective and present some possible defenses
against systems such as TEEVIL. These countermeasures
extend our reasoning presented in Section 4, and follow from
the most powerful adversary models we considered. We dis-
cuss existing countermeasures for the two applications we
9
considered throughout this paper (OSNs and e-voting), and
then elaborate on potential future measures. We attempt to
order defenses by increased complexity for the defending enti-
ties, and highlight that all countermeasures require significant
effort for the defenders. In particular, some countermeasures
require an unrealistic amount of collaboration between na-
tions and services while others only lessen the impact but do
not entirely prevent the problem. In conclusion, we believe
that none of these countermeasures is easily employable to
defend against systems such as TEEVIL, and more research
attention is necessary to stop this threat.
5.1 Existing Techniques - OSNs
There already exist countermeasures against “non-human”
accounts and interactions on OSNs, both deployed by com-
mercial providers and proposed in the literature. We coarsely
group them according to what OSNs can analyze: (i) users’
behavior, trying to understand if the actions were performed
automatically, and (ii) users’ interactions, e.g., posted content,
or targets of “like” actions, trying to uncover automatically
generated content by TEEVIL.
Users’ Behavior. The behaviour of authentic users can be
fully imitated by TEEVIL. Detecting rented accounts is thus
identical to the conventional bot detection problem. We dis-
cuss two aspects of this problem and the relevant literature
next. First, services might try to use CAPTCHAs [84] to
detect automated actions. However, CAPTCHAs can be by-
passed by advances in machine learning technologies [92],
or by offloading them to cheap labor [64]. Services might
also build users’ behavioral profiles and try to detect “com-
promised” accounts; however, most approaches presented in
literature are based on machine learning [3] – turning into a
cat and mouse game where detection can be easily avoided by
changing strategies [82, 86]. Second, services might try to de-
tect if users’ behavior changes abruptly, or deviates for a long
time from previous behavioral profilings [3, 41]. However,
in a platform such as TEEVIL, rented actions are interleaved
with identity owners’ benign behavior, and it is thus unclear
if any of these solutions applies to identity lease. OSNs can
instead try to detect behavior similar to TEEVIL’s identity
owners: brief deviations from normal behavior [82], and then
try to correlate such deviations among multiple accounts [32]
in order to expose vast campaigns. Proposals in the area
still rely on hand-crafted features that TEEVIL can manipu-
late, and plausible deniability still applies: identity owners
can claim it was their legitimate interaction, therefore it is
hard to argue that OSNs can easily start deleting posts and
interactions. Ultimately, we note that even though fake and
compromised accounts are a well studied problem in research,
OSNs still struggle to detect them [35, 79], showing that this
problem is far from trivial.
Users’ Interactions. Services are interested in trying to de-
tect crowdturfed and fake content. There has been a lot of
effort in detecting such content [48, 68], accounts involved
in crowdturfing activities [65], and even the targets of crowd-
turfing actions [76]. However, this is again a cat-and-mouse
game, as recent efforts have shown how to evade such classi-
fiers [86] and how to automatically generate realistic content
that can fool even human readers [52, 91]. To conclude, some
of the arguments for (i) still apply: plausible deniability is
not violated, as there is no proof that identity owners did not
generate the dubious content, and these countermeasures are
even ineffective if there is no observable result.
5.2 Existing Techniques - E-voting
In this section we analyze how some security properties of e-
voting schemes might defend against TEEVIL by preventing
its operations, or by violating TEEVIL’s requirements. In
particular, here we look at three properties of e-voting and we
refer the interested reader to Appendix A.4 for more details.
First, verifiability, and in particular individual verifiability,
gives the voters confidence that their vote was recorded as
intended. Second, coercion-resistance removes the possibility
from voters to prove to third parties how (and whether) they
voted. Finally, privacy is a weaker form of coercion-resistance
which prevents votes from being linked to a specific voter.
We premise our analysis by observing that, regarding in-
teractions between an e-voting service and TEEVIL, the
TEEVIL enclave acts as both the device with which the user
votes, and as the voter itself, from the point of view of the
voting service. This behaviour is referred to as a simulation
attack [50] in the literature since the enclave can perfectly
emulate a voter. We note that voters successfully enroll as
identity owners by providing all the secret that they needed
to register and participate in the election.
Privacy. This property inadvertently helps the indistinguisha-
bility and plausible deniability properties of TEEVIL. Be-
cause of voter privacy, it is very challenging for the voting
authorities to distinguish between voters giving their inputs
to a legitimate voting device, and the TEEVIL enclave au-
tonomously voting on behalf of a voter – because the TEEVIL
enclave can be seen as a voting device. Another consequence
of voter privacy is that even in the extreme case in which
the election authorities could tell which votes were cast with
TEEVIL5, they would not be able to link them to specific
voters.
Verifiability and Coercion-Resistance. Verifiability [22,56]
and coercion-resistance [19, 20, 50] have an impact on the
fairness property of TEEVIL. In particular, the former aids
it, while the latter could break it, thus potentially being a
concrete defence for e-voting against TEEVIL.
5For instance, because the election allows write-ins that were used only
when voting with the TEEVIL enclave.
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A distinct difference from e-voting to OSNs is that in e-
voting a identity owner can only sell one single action per
election (i.e., one vote), as opposed to OSNs where usually
actions can be performed and reverted an arbitrary number of
times. Individual verifiability, in this case, helps to achieve
fairness: since the TEEVIL enclave acts as the voter, it can
check whether a vote has been cast and whether it reflects the
choice that the identity renter is willing to pay for. This aspect
is particularly relevant when one considers the different policy
with regards to multiple ballots submissions for a voter. In
particular, for each voter two policies are common: (i) only
the first vote counts and all subsequent votes are discarded, (ii)
only the last submitted ballot counts, and all previous ones are
ignored. Individual verifiability allows to check whether any
vote was submitted before (or whether no vote was submitted
after, respectively) the TEEVIL enclave casts its vote.
Coercion-resistance [19, 50] is the most promising prop-
erty to defend against TEEVIL. However, while coercion-
resistance makes it impossible to prove to a third party that
a voter voted in a particular way, the voter itself (in order
to guarantee individual verifiability) has to be able to check
the content of its own cast ballot. Therefore, if the TEEVIL
enclave has valid voting credentials, since it acts as a voter,
coercion-resistance does little to prevent the enclave to verify
that the vote was cast correctly - this is effectively a simula-
tion attack. Hence, in order to prevent a simulation attack,
in [50] it is proposed to allow the voter to generate arbitrary
invalid voting credentials which are indistinguishable from
the real ones (the votes cast with these credentials are later
discarded). However, since the initial credentials are deliv-
ered to the voter by the election registration authorities, the
TEEVIL enclave could simply ask for the transcript of this
interaction to verify that the credentials are the valid ones6.
Receipt-freeness is a weaker property than coercion-
resistance, which is often looked at in the literature [44, 57,
58, 63]. On the other hand, it does not help against TEEVIL,
since it requires the voter to vote on its own and without being
observed by the coercer (usually by assuming an untappable
channel to the voting servers). This is because TEEVIL votes
on behalf of the voter. Therefore, since TEEVIL violates
one of the key assumptions of receipt-freeness, any protocol
providing this property cannot impact fairness in TEEVIL.
In conclusion, most properties of e-voting schemes inadver-
tently make TEEVIL more robust, thus making the design of
effective defenses very challenging for this application. Any
protocol providing privacy and individual verifiability - two
key properties of any e-voting protocol - strengthens the fair-
ness, indistinguishability, and plausible deniability properties
of TEEVIL. Receipt-freeness, a property suggested multi-
ple times to combat vote selling, is completely ineffective
against TEEVIL. In many coercion-resistant schemes it is
6Juels et al. [50] assume that this transcript can be deleted by the voter,
but in TEEVIL the voter wants to sell his vote and can choose to not delete
the transcript.
assumed that the coercer (i.e., TEEVIL) cannot simulate the
voter during registration [20,50], and is not always physically
collocated with the voter [28]. Only when these two assump-
tions hold7, coercion-resistant protocols break the fairness
property of TEEVIL.
5.3 New Defenses
Enroll Fake Accounts. Any service could easily create
“ghost”accounts: profiles that seem genuine but do not affect
anything on the service, e.g., such accounts could post content
that no one can see in an OSN. Thus, by enrolling a large
number of such accounts, the service can try to lessen the im-
pact and make campaigns less effective. However, TEEVIL
could use other accounts to verify the actions. This however,
would still be effective for e-voting and other applications in
which the identity owners’ actions are not observable. How-
ever, some decentralized designs of TEEVIL could make this
mitigation too expensive to deploy, as we will discuss in
Section 7.1.
Provide Incentives for Identity Owners. Identity owners
participate in TEEVIL to gain monetary rewards. The service
could play the same game and offer compensation for reveal-
ing their participation in TEEVIL, undermining the potential
impact of rented accounts. However, this is a clear conflict
of interest for the service and potentially results in all users
wanting to receive some compensation.
Start Campaigns to De-anonymize. The service could start
his own campaigns on very specific content which might
not even be reachable without a direct link. The users who
then perform an action on the prepared resource are directly
confirmed to be identity owners in TEEVIL and can be put
under increased monitoring. Note that this would not be
effective for applications in which the actions are not linked
to identity owners (such as e-voting). In any case, the service
would have to spend money and pay each identity owners a
small amount for revealing themselves. Additionally, TEEVIL
could require a set of actions to go to the content instead of a
single link.
Compromising Every Identity Owner’s OS.
If a government is interested in identifying the identity own-
ers of a system like TEEVIL, because for instance it suspects
that they are being used to compromise its election process,
it is not difficult to imagine that it would try to convince a
OS vendor to monitor all its users to discover which ones are
enrolled in TEEVIL. However, monitoring every action of
every user’s device for the sake of identifying users that might
7For instance, the registration phase can be done in person, thus prevent-
ing the attacker from obtaining a transcript with the initial credentials of the
voter. However, the case in which TEEVIL has all the secrets of the voter is
equivalent to the case in which it is physically collocated with it since it can
check how and whether a voter voted.
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be participating in TEEVIL would pose serious concerns for
the privacy of all citizens.
Global Network Attacker. Another way to expose parties
involved in TEEVIL is by observing the network and corre-
lating activities of TEEVIL and identity owners, for example
by correlating timing. To do so, services and governments
would need to be in control of large portions of the network.
However, this leads to worrisome consequences on privacy
and censorship: governments need to control the Internet
over their whole country to expose TEEVIL. Moreover, the
reach of nation state adversaries is usually limited to their
sovereignty – if TEEVIL would distribute its infrastructure
over rival countries, cooperation between these nations is
unlikely.
6 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of TEEVIL using widely avail-
able Intel SGX enclaves. Namely, we implemented the in-
terface enclave, a service enclave for Reddit, and a payment
enclave for ZCash. In our implementation, a identity renter
can buy “upvotes” on Reddit posts, for which identity own-
ers are rewarded with a payment in ZCash. The interface
enclave and the service enclave are implemented in C++ using
the Intel SGX SDK [46], while the payment enclave is built
using rust. All enclaves communicate with each other and
external parties using TLS. Note that the TLS endpoint lies
in the enclaves and the OS is only responsible for the TCP/IP
protocol.
Interface Enclave. The interface enclave uses a prototype
storage backend similar to a very minimal database to store a
large number of identity owner credentials while still keep-
ing the data under the protection mechanisms of Intel SGX.
The interface enclave exposes a RESTful API interface to
external parties which supports all the previously described
interactions with TEEVIL. It also supports multithreading for
improved performance.
Service Enclave (Reddit). To successfully perform actions
on the identity owner’s behalf, it’s important for the enclave
to behave as close to a genuine user as possible, performing
all the necessary POST/GET and cookie exchanges just as
the browser would. The service enclave exposes a REST API,
just like the interface enclave, and the confidentiality of the
parameters (most notably, the identity owner’s credentials)
exchanged from one enclave to the other is ensured by TLS.
Payment Enclave. It is now feasible to create shielded ZCash
transactions in an Intel SGX enclave, as generating a zk-
SNARK only needs 85MB of memory in our measurements8,
thanks to the 2018 “Sapling” update [11]. The payment
8SGX enclaves so far support only up to 128MB of memory. Swapping
allows to use more memory but severely hurts performance.
enclave uses a modified version of the bellman library for the
required zk-SNARKs [94], which is also used in the official
ZCash implementation. Since Intel SGX enclaves do not
support the standard POSIX multithreading API, we run the
zk-SNARK generation on a single core.
To create ZCash transactions, the payment enclave needs
to get the Merkle paths to the notes9 that it wants to spend.
We use the scheme described in [90] to keep up to date paths
to all spendable notes.
Proxy. We use a proxy on a device of the identity owner
to tunnel the requests of the service enclave. We note that
identity owners do not necessarily need to manually set up
and configure a proxy on their devices. The process can
be automated, e.g., by providing pre-configured apps, or by
downloading a configuration file (which can be made avail-
able through the enclave website) on their device – so the
only information they need to enter manually is related to the
service’s credentials and policies.
The devices the identity owner uses for this proxy might be
behind a NAT or change IP address. Therefore we require a
regular polling message to the interface enclave that updates
the proxy information of the respective identity owner. Such
polling message could be done manually by connecting again
to the enclave web interface, or automatically by letting the
identity owners install an app in their devices.
Scalability. The architecture of TEEVIL is designed with
scalability in mind: it supports many service enclaves and
payment enclaves that run concurrently. The interface enclave
transmits a list of tasks to the service and payment enclaves
which then try to execute all of the tasks in an asynchronous
manner. After that, they respond with a confirmation for all
correctly executed tasks.
6.1 Performance Evaluation
We now evaluate the performance of our implementation of
TEEVIL on a desktop with an i7-8700k. For experiments that
require a second machine we use a separate machine with an
i7-7700K. Since we do not have access to a large amount of
credentials for Reddit, we split the evaluation into three parts:
Reddit actions, inter-enclave communication, and zk-SNARK
generation. We then show how to combine these results to
obtain an estimate for the complete system.
Reddit. We repeatedly performed an “upvote” on a controlled
selection of posts using four accounts created specifically
for this purpose. We present the aggreated results over 100
measurements in Table 1. Note that we show the distinct
measurements of the 5 different requests (from logging in to
the service, to finding the content and interacting with it) that
make up a single “upvote” action.
9A note in ZCash is similar to an output in Bitcoin.
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Baseline implementation SGX
Average [s] Std [s] Average [s] Std [s]
1st request 0.971 0.295 1.202 0.249
2nd request 0.370 0.158 0.402 0.128
3rd request 0.663 0.175 0.769 0.197
4th request 1.581 0.275 1.560 0.298
5th request 0.280 0.206 0.355 0.329
Total 3.865 0.511 4.288 0.561
Table 1: A step-by-step timing of a Reddit “upvote”, divided
into the 5 required network requests, performed by our SGX
service enclave compared to a baseline implementation out-
side the enclave (sample size: 100 “upvotes”; ping: 13.2ms).
Every service enclave also needs to check the consistency
of the ZCash blockchain state provided by the identity owner
and identity renter. Our implementation verifies the proof-of-
work and hash chain for 10 blockheaders in 2.9ms on average,
which is negligible compared to the total time.
TLS Between Enclaves. We measured the throughput and
latency of TLS connections between two enclaves to show
how the interface enclave would communicate with ser-
vice and payment enclaves. Our implementation man-
ages to complete 56.3 TLS handshakes per second be-
tween two enclaves with 8 threads each using cipher
suite TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384. Thus,
TEEVIL can scale to a large number of service and payment
enclaves.
zk-SNARKs. We compare the time spent to generate a zk-
SNARK proof in the unmodified bellman library and inside In-
tel SGX in Table 2. Notably, Intel SGX adds about 10% over-
head compared to normal operation. In our application multi-
threading is not necessary since we require a high throughput
of zk-SNARKs per second and do not optimize solely on la-
tency. A higher throughput can easily be reached by spawning
more payment enclaves.
Example. To show how to combine our performance evalu-
ation into an accurate estimate for a specific instantiation of
TEEVIL, we present an example in the following.
Let’s assume an identity renter wants to start a campaign
on Reddit with 1000 identity owners. TEEVIL is instanti-
ated with one interface enclave, 25 service enclaves, and 25
payment enclaves. The interface enclave first splits the 1000
actions into batches of 40 actions each, and then sends one
batch to each service enclave. Each service enclave then tries
to fulfill all actions, and sends a confirmation report back after
about 160s. In these 160s all requested actions should be per-
formed on Reddit, ideally boosting popularity of the content
specified by the identity renter. After this period of time, the
interface enclave transmits the list of confirmed actions and
blockchain addresses of the identity owners to the payment
Time [ms]
1 Thread 4 Threads 8 Threads
Normal 4521 ± 43.2 1322 ± 26.6 975 ± 37.4
Intel SGX 4935 ± 114.1 7 7
Table 2: Zk-SNARK performance comparison between Intel
SGX and normal operation (sample size: 100 proofs).
enclaves. The payment enclaves will then issue all the reward
transactions in about 200s.
7 Discussion
In this section, we first discuss a way to strengthen the current
TEEVIL protocol by moving to a decentralized mode, then
we look at the addition of anonymity networks, and finally
we discuss compromised TEEs.
7.1 Decentralizing TEEVIL
If any system like TEEVIL were ever to be realized, com-
promising its availability would be one of the first objectives
some attackers (e.g., services and governments) would be
after. In the current attacker model (cf. Section 4) a single
adversary controlling the OS of the infrastructure maintainer
can shut-down TEEVIL, by blocking the enclave execution or
cutting off all the network connections to the enclaves. There-
fore, TEEVIL has a central point of failure: the infrastructure
maintainer. In the interest of availability, we sketch two ways
in which a fully distributed TEEVIL system could be built,
which we call Distributed TEEVIL and P2P TEEVIL.
Distributed TEEVIL. It is easy to extend the TEEVIL pro-
tocol to allow multiple independent parties to run a service
enclave and a payment enclave (cf. Section 3.4). To incen-
tivise people to help TEEVIL scale, and be more tolerant to
DoS attacks, anyone running service or payment enclaves can
get a reward for the actions going through their machine.
Distributing the interface enclave requires a bit more con-
sideration, as they may need to synchronize between each
other (e.g., with a gossip protocol). We envision a system
in which multiple interface enclaves manage campaigns in-
dependently of each other, but keep a global list of identity
owners. With this architecture, each enclave type (interface,
payment, and service) is connected to at least another inter-
face enclave, and interface enclaves need to have at least one
payment enclave and one service enclave connected to them
to be operational. We provide an example of this topology in
Figure 5a. A more detailed architecture is in Appendix B
P2P TEEVIL. To decentralize TEEVIL in the P2P design,
we eliminate the interface enclave altogether. We envision a
system in which many identity owners have a machine with
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(a) Distributed TEEVIL. (b) P2P TEEVIL.
Figure 5: Decentralized TEEVIL. Blue nodes are interface en-
claves, red nodes service enclaves, and yellow nodes payment
enclaves.
an SGX enabled CPU, or equivalent technology that allows
to run a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
In this design, each identity owner hosts its credentials
in an enclave running in its machine. Such an enclave is a
combination of the payment and service enclaves: it takes care
of the connection to the service, and of rewarding the identity
owner through the blockchain. Note that, in this design, we do
not need a proxy since the enclaves will connect to the service
directly from the identity owners’ device. These enclaves can
build a network between them so that a identity renter only
needs to contact one of them to start a campaign. We depict
the topology of this P2P TEEVIL in Figure 5b.
Upon providing the funds to any one of the TEEVIL en-
claves, the contacted enclave will take care of broadcasting
the campaign request on the network. Other identity owners’
enclaves will then take care of performing the campaign ac-
tions if they have the credentials of any compliant account (cf.
Section 3.2.3). The TEEVIL enclave is not restricted to serve
a single identity owners credential, but it can serve as a node
for other identity owners who cannot or do not wish to run a
TEEVIL enclave in their machine. These users can delegate
their credential to a identity owner which they trust.
We highlight an additional security benefit given by P2P
TEEVIL. One of the possible countermeasures to TEEVIL is
enrolling a large number of fake identity owners by targeted
services. We discussed that, when the result of bought ac-
tions is not observable, this violates the fairness property of
the protocol. In P2P TEEVIL we could restrict registration
of only a single identity owner per CPU, thus requiring the
service to invest in CPUs in order to flood TEEVIL with fake
accounts. Such solution could be enforced for example by
using Intel’s linkable attestation protocol [49]. This mitiga-
tion would raise the bar for services interested in damaging
TEEVIL, but it would also limit its reach, since real identity
owners without an SGX CPU will not be able to participate
in TEEVIL anymore.
7.2 Adding anonymity networks to TEEVIL
We discussed in Section 4.3 that TEEVIL cannot provide any
meaningful guarantees in terms of anonymity. This is based
on the fact that depending on the service type, the service
provider can invest in campaigns that require identity owners
to perform some actions that would not be otherwise possible
by an identity owner not participating in the campaign. Since
the service can observe the results of the campaign on a per-
user basis, it can then de-anonymize these identity owners, by
monitoring which ones performed the action.
This de-anonymization requires the service to be able to
monitor the actions of its users, which is in general not possi-
ble for every service. E-voting is an instance of such a service
type, since it needs to guarantee the anonymity of the vote,
and therefore by design it should not be possible to look at
the actions of identity owners to correlate them with a custom
campaign action.
However, even with services in which identity owners ac-
tions cannot be observed, if the service provider can correlate
connections from the infrastructure maintainer to the service
it might be able to de-anonymize the user. To perform this cor-
relation the service provider either needs to collude with the
infrastructure maintainer or to compromise its OS. Observe
that in a decentralized version of TEEVIL the attacker could
simply run a couple of service enclaves in order to observe
connections going to the service from the TEEVIL enclaves.
An anonymity network such as Tor [29] provides two main
advantages to TEEVIL. First, it provide more resilience
against the attacker introduced in this section, since corre-
lating connections through Tor is only possible for a global
network attacker, and compromising two nodes (the service
enclave and the service itself) is not enough anymore to track
a connection.
Second, if any of the TEEVIL enclaves are running as
hidden tor services [29], it would be difficult to localize
them and consequently shutting them down, thus providing
stronger availability if combined with a decentralized version
of TEEVIL. Note that this would give stronger confidence
to the users of TEEVIL as well, since they would know that
even if the OS of the TEEVIL enclaves is compromised, that
enclave would not be able to observe the real IP addresses of
both identity owners and identity renters connecting to it.
7.3 Compromised TEEs
TEEVIL relies on the security of the Trusted Execution En-
vironment (i.e., Intel SGX) to protect the confidentiality of
its users and guarantee fairness among the different entities
which participate in the protocol. Physically compromising a
single enclave, or discovering a vulnerability that allows to
compromise its remote attestation mechanisms, would jeopar-
dize all the security properties of TEEVIL.
Microarchitectural attacks have surfaced that compromise
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TEEs [81] and side-channel leakage might allow attackers
to infer secret data inside of Trusted Execution Environ-
ments [13,59]. Other attacks, such as physical attacks, are ex-
pensive, usually cannot be amortized on multiple processors,
and can only be done on devices in the physical possession
of the attacker. This implies that in the centralized version of
TEEVIL (cf. Section 3) such types of attacks could be carried
out only if the attacker is the infrastructure maintainer or if
the attacker can gain physical access to the facilities of the
infrastructure maintainer. Thus making the attack not only
expensive, but also very difficult to be carried out in practice
on an already deployed system.
However, these limitations vanish in the decentralized ver-
sion of TEEVIL introduced above. The attacker can run its
own TEEVIL enclave and join the network. Thus it would
have physical control over one of the deployed TEEVIL en-
claves. In distributed TEEVIL (cf. Section 7.1), physically
compromising any enclave leaks every identity owner ever
enrolled. While on P2P TEEVIL compromising an enclave
leaks all the identity owners that decided to delegate their
credentials to the enclave hosted by the attacker. Thus the
two version of TEEVIL offer different guarantees in this sce-
nario, and might justify the cost of physically compromising
a processor, depending on how valuable is the information
protected by the TEEVIL enclave for the attacker.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated a new type of user monetization
through identity lease and discussed its potential effects on
digital societies. We showed through the examples of OSNs
and e-voting that such a system, which combines Trusted
Execution Environments (TEEs) and anonymous cryptocur-
rencies, could allow seamless facilitation of leasing identities
via account rental, and subsequently impact the real world.
We designed a protocol that, thanks to advances in these tech-
nologies, can implement such a system called TEEVIL, and
conducted real world tests using legitimate credentials on the
Reddit online social network.
We showed how TEEVIL allows, for the first time, creation
of a large-scale marketplace which guarantees fairness, indis-
tinguishability and plausible deniability to all the participating
parties with acceptable performance.
Such a marketplace could be used to polarize people’s opin-
ion by influencing them on online social networks and even
to directly compromise e-voting, to name two of its possi-
ble applications. Because of the impact that TEEVIL could
have on people’s online presence and democratic discourse
we discussed several defences that could be deployed against
systems such as TEEVIL, and note that further research is
necessary in this direction.
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A Background
A.1 Trusted Execution Environments
Modern TEE environments, such as ARM TrustZone [4, 88]
and Intel SGX [23,45], enable isolated code execution within
a user’s system with several additional properties. Namely, in
this work we use Intel’s SGX as the example TEE for imple-
menting TEEVIL. SGX is represented through an instruction
set architecture extension for Intel CPUs. The isolated exe-
cution is manifested through so called secure enclaves that
have user-level privileges and which can be attested. En-
claves are accessed using ocall/ecall interfaces [46] that
switch control between the enclaves and the OS. Intel SGX
architecture offers protections from a compromised OS, other
malicious applications, VMs, BIOS and even other insecure
hardware on the residing platform [16, 43, 53, 89]. Below we
briefly summarize the main protective mechanisms supported
by SGX. Readers familiar with Intel SGX can skip the rest of
this subsection. For in-depth background of SGX see [23,47].
Attestation. Attestation is the process of verifying that en-
clave code has been properly initialized [23, 49]. A statement
containing measurements of enclave’s initialization sequence,
code, and issuer key is created, signed by the Qouting En-
clave and forwarded to the remote verifier which can check
the signature using Intel’s online attestation service.
Isolation. SGX security architecture guarantees enclave iso-
lation [62], using protective mechanisms enforced in the
processor, from all software running outside of the enclave.
The control-flow integrity of the enclave is preserved and
the state is not observable. Additionally, all runtime enclave
memory is encrypted and cannot be accessed by the OS.
Sealing. To securely store confidential data across reboots
(for persistent storage) by encrypting and authenticating it,
enclaves use a mechanism called sealing [5]. Each enclave is
provided with a private sealing key (derived from the master
Fuse key and Identity Key) that is used for this action.
A.2 Cryptocurrencies
Digital currencies that are based on blockchains became
widely used with the rise of Bitcoin [67] and are now known
under the name cryptocurrencies. To this date there exist many
hundreds different blockchain based cryptocurrencies. Such
systems allow anyone to issue payments to other parties in a
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peer-to-peer fashion without any trust assumptions on a single
central entity. However, Bitcoin is not an ideal replacement
for the long-standing cash system because it forfeits user pri-
vacy [6, 71]. Instead, it provides pseudonymity, where every
user hides behind one or more pseudonyms. Recent work has
shown, that pseudonyms in Bitcoin can be linked easily [55].
New systems, such as ZCash [72], have been proposed to
provide fully anonymous transactions by taking advantage of
recent advances in succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs (zk-SNARKs) [8]. These transactions not only hide
the participating parties but also the transferred amount while
still guaranteeing the correctness of the transaction.
Consistent View of a Blockchain. Given two blockchains A
and B, with A being a longer chain than B, we say that A is
consistent with B if both A and B are valid blockchains and
A is an extension of B, in the sense that it contains at least all
the blocks of B in the same order.
A.3 Brokered Delegation
Secure and flexible delegation of credentials and rights for
a variety of different service was introduced in [61]. The
authors demonstrate the potential of using TEEs for the secure
delegation of credentials primarily in the context of payments.
A.4 E-voting
A wide range of security properties are usually looked at
when designing an e-voting protocol, notably: (i) several
flavours of verifiability [22,56], (ii) privacy, and (iii) coercion-
resistance [50]. First, verifiability (i) comes in different forms,
three of whom are common: individual, universal, and end-to-
end verifiability. Individual verifiability refers to the ability of
the voter to check whether its vote has been recorded correctly
by the voting authorities, generally this means verifying that
the ballot is present in a bulletin board, and that said ballot
contains the choice intended by the voter. Universal verifia-
bility allows to verify that all the honest votes present in the
bulletin board are tallied and counted correctly. End-to-end
verifiability allows to check that the votes of all the honest
voters whom have checked their vote are cast and counted
correctly. Second, privacy (ii) should guarantee that the pref-
erence of a voter (including whether he or she voted at all)
remains confidential. Coercion-resistance (iii) aims to pre-
vent coercion of votes mostly by making it impossible for a
voter to prove to a third party that he or she voted in a par-
ticular way. Coercion-resistance (iii) is a stronger property
than privacy. A common way to achieve (iii) is to require
receipt-freeness [44, 57, 58, 63], which ensures that either the
voter does not get a confirmation binding him to a specific
choice, or that he can fake any such receipt to a third party,
thus making it impossible for said third party to rely on the
information provided by the voter. While receipt-freeness can
be used to obtain coercion-resistance, there is a difference be-
tween the two properties [28]. In receipt-freeness the coercer
is usually modeled as an observer that can merely examine the
transcript of the interaction between the voter and the voting
servers, while in coercion-resistance the coercer is interactive
and can instruct the voters to reveal private keys and inject
chosen messages during the voting process. Note that both
receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance cannot be achieved
if the e-voting protocol does not guarantee privacy.
B Distributed TEEVIL
It is easy to extend the TEEVIL protocol to allow multiple
independent parties to run a service enclave and a payment
enclave (cf. Section 3.4). The protocol already supports mul-
tiple enclaves running in parallel, and there is no functional or
security requirement forcing them to be run only in a single
server maintained by a single infrastructure maintainer. To
incentivise people to help TEEVIL scale, and be more tolerant
to DoS attacks, anyone running one of these enclaves can get a
reward for the actions going through their machine. Payment
enclaves can send a previously agreed part of the payment to
the blockchain address of their owner. Service enclaves need
to provide the blockchain address in which they wish to be
rewarded to the interface enclave. Their blockchain address
can be given to the interface enclave during the enlistment
phase (cf. Section 3.4), the interface enclave would then take
care of instructing the payment enclaves to issue a reward to
the owners of the relevant service enclaves.
Distributing the interface enclave requires a bit more con-
sideration, as we need to define: (i) how to keep a global
view of all the users, (ii) how the interactions between dif-
ferent instances of the interface enclaves would work, and
(iii) how different instances synchronize with other payment
and service enclaves to carry out a campaign. To meet these
requirements we envision a system in which multiple inter-
face enclaves manage campaigns independently of each other,
but keep a global list of identity owners. With this architec-
ture, each enclave type (interface, payment, and service) is
connected to at least another interface enclave, and interface
enclaves need to have at least one payment enclave and one
service enclave connected to them to be operational. We pro-
vide an example of this topology in Figure 5a. This topology
allows to easily address (ii) and (iii), since each interface
enclave can operate independently of the others, therefore no
synchronization or communication is required for a campaign
creation (cf. Section 3.2.2) and during the automatic interac-
tions (cf. Section 3.2.3) phase. Decentralizing TEEVIL in
this way implies that no change is required for the protocol of
these two phases, besides the detail that instead of contacting
the infrastructure maintainer, now the identity renter contacts
any interface enclave, and that interface enclave takes care of
completing the campaign. To ensure that funds are not lost
if an interface enclave is killed in the middle of a campaign,
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any payment enclave which was part of the campaign could
inform another interface enclave and coordinate with it to stop
the campaign and return the remaining funds.
Regarding (i), we observe that interface enclaves do not
need to keep a perfectly synchronized global view of all the
users enrolled. Therefore in this design, it would be sufficient
to employ a gossip protocol in which, in each round, every
interface enclave lets its neighbouring interface enclaves know
about new credentials. As long as the network of interface
enclaves is not partitioned this will ensure that eventually
each interface enclave will be aware of a new user. To not
flood the network this could be done in batches of users. If a
group of interface enclaves goes offline before their identity
owners were propagated to any other node, we can simply
let the lost identity owners re-enroll with a new interface
enclave. However, this has the downside that if any identity
owner wants to update their policies, they will not be instantly
reflected in the whole network.
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